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 TECHNOLOGY SPACE ACTIVITY AND FAILURE 
A STUDY OF HI-TECH VC-BACKED WIRELESS STARTUPS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates failure of startups due to their accumulation of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) in the context of the wireless telecommunication industry, here 
framed as their technology space - a space that we constructed through shared technology. 
Obtaining intellectual property rights forms an important signal for startup viability but 
only to a limited degree, compelling us to posit a U shape relationship between failure 
rate and IPR flow. The location of startups in the technology space, and the associated 
signals that come with that location presents powerful information regarding their failure 
rates. Disclosing intellectual properties erodes the benefits of secrecy and innovative lead 
time as deference (as proxied by patent citations) by peer to new firms increases their 
hazard of failure due potential competition and harmful spillover effects - particularly if 
the sector manifests a weak appropriability regime. Technology concentration of the 
deference is also found to be harmful; however the interaction of the two is positive. This 
leads us to infer that startups with specific and focused technology acknowledged many 
other firms or those with general but deferred to by few others have better possibility of 
stemming the rot.  
Keywords: Technology space; failure; wireless; technological innovation; 
entrepreneurship; IPR strategy
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INTRODUCTION 
“Intellectual property portfolios are the lifeblood of many wireless tech firms. But patent 
disputes can cost millions of dollars to defend and take years to resolve” 
- Cover Story, Wireless Week, August 15, 2005 
 
We observe a peculiar split in the literature regarding technological evolution and 
firm survival. On the on hand some authors address the failure of large established firms 
that bring along the baggage of their legacy technological platform as the sector endures 
some major disruptions (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Tushman & Anderson 1986; 
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Henderson 1993). On the other hand many other studies 
explore the success and failure of firms, whose technological platform coincides with the 
stage of their sector’s technological evolution and where quality of new firms are 
signaled reasonably through the granting of intellectual property rights with concomitant 
endorsements from incumbents (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008). 
Affiliation with prominent third parties is shown to have important certification benefits 
diminishing the odds of failure and improving the chance of going public. Patent grants 
have positive effects on valuations obtained during financing thus establishing their 
importance as signals of quality. The present study tries to add to these literatures by 
focusing on a context where discontinuous technological changes are managed by 
incumbents and where disclosure and endorsements might have important costs that 
outweigh their benefits, especially in the technology domain.   
The appropriability regime of a firm’s sector conditions its technology strategy 
(Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 1994; Klevorick, 
Levin, Nelson, Winter, 1995). The sector that is the subject of this paper, wireless and 
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mobile communication is characterized by use of trade secrets and lead times in 
innovations, which far outweigh patenting, and the disclosure of intellectual property as a 
signaling mechanism might be fraught with harmful spillover and imitation, not to 
mention the threat of potential, very costly patent litigation, as highlighted in the opening 
quote. The same holds for third-party certification, especially endorsement by prominent 
firms who not only control important complementary assets like customers and 
distribution but also enjoy an undue hegemony around the shaping of technological 
direction and dominant designs. This is especially true for the wireless and mobile 
communication industry where operators like Verizon and Vodafone control the end 
users and vendors like Nokia and Qualcomm define the technology platforms.  
In the following parts of this paper we first develop theory and testable 
hypotheses.  We provide a description of the empirical setting and brief history of the 
sector. Next we describe the dataset, analysis, and results. The main research question 
addresses the effect of a new venture’s technological conduct on failure rate in a sector 
that is highly contested and dominated by major competitors along the value chain. Any 
nascent firm in this sector faces the dilemma of signaling technological advancement and 
enhanced certification at the cost of reverse engineering or infringement claims that are 
product of a poor appropriability regime. While intellectual property grants can be 
construed as milestones that confer legitimacy to a startup they also expose the firm to 
spillovers and imitation, resulting paradoxically in trade secrets and non-disclosure as a 
more favorable avenue in securing a competitive technological advantage.  We conclude 
by making some inferences about the results and future path.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 The technology strategy that a startup pursues hinges on the conditions in its 
domain of technology. The intellectual property rights (IPR) strategy assumed by a firm 
depends very much on the appropriability regime (Teece, 1986) in that domain as well as 
on the direction and velocity of its technological trajectory.  The pertinent literature is 
replete with highly visible framings of its history including the rise and fall of a dominant 
design (Utterback, 1994), incremental and radical innovation (Tushman & Anderson, 
1986; Henderson & Clark, 1994), core change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and 
disruption (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Many empirical studies underscored the role of 
discontinuous innovations in toppling established incumbents. Invariably they impute an 
unmanaged evolution as in organic life forms. Other studies, however, imply some 
visible (Cusumano, Mylonadis, Rosenbloom, 1992) or invisible (Van de Ven and Garud, 
1994) hand in driving the speed and direction of technology, and suggest that its 
trajectories are shaped through formal standard setting and collusive practices. The 
wireless sector is one such area of activity, where regulatory bodies, standard setting 
consortia and the market power of large firms render the sector checkered and gradual in 
its development. Finding an optimum strategy in such an “technology space” is most 
challenging, especially for small new entrants. 
Startup Technology Space 
We conceptualize technology space as the network formed between firms through 
sharing the same technology activity over the course of the sector’s history. Since there is 
a strong incentive to innovate in similar and incremental technologies a pronounced 
core/periphery distinction is to be expected. Attempts at radical innovations reside at the 
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periphery while those that conform to prevailing norms and practices occupy central 
positions. Concurrent with the aggregate evolution, startups build up their technology 
platform and try to establish their legitimacy and so disclose their intellectual property 
incrementally.  We believe that in doing so they endure their technological edge as a 
double edged sword: depending on the balance they fail or survive.  In the following 
paragraphs we elaborate. 
 
IPR as Signal 
In the absence of credible, established track records, startup firms signal the 
underlying value of their venture to investors and other stakeholders. In their study on 
semiconductor firms,  Hsu & Ziedonis (2008) show that IPRs significantly determines  
venture valuations, ceteris paribus and fosters the likelihood of sourcing a prominent VC 
in the first funding round. Their semiconductor sector also exhibits an unfavorable 
appropriability regime. If the filing and granting of patents confers such positive 
signaling benefits, we should expect in our setting likewise IPR’s to perform and 
important signaling function in attracting new investors and convince existing promoters 
of its viability. However, this benefit of growth in IPR does not accrue monotonically. 
Instead we should anticipate decreasing returns to R&D output as investors and other 
stakeholders update their evaluation of quality over time. Patenting is not only costly but 
also is afflicted with unwanted and harmful spillovers and imitation.  
We therefore hypothesize:  
H1. The yearly flow of patents granted to a startup has a U-shaped relationship 
with its hazard of failure  
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Distance in Technology Space (Core/Periphery Structure) 
A sector characterized by a core-periphery structure, a putative directionality in 
technological developments and widely shared, established industry standards reward 
startups that innovate in its core technologies. The case of ComSpace Corp, a Texas 
based company that received $26 million in equity financing from the likes of Sevin 
Rosen Funds and Noro-Moseley Partners illustrates this trend quite convincingly. It 
owned about 20 patents, which allowed an eightfold amount of traffic to be carried over 
existing radio channels. Called Digital Multicarrier Architecture -- DCMA for short – the 
technology also handled data, meaning it could be used for wireless access of the Internet, 
short-text messaging, e-mail and video. However, DCMA in spite of sharing a nearly 
identical acronym with Code Division Multiplex Access (CDMA), one of the core 
technologies standardized by industry incumbents, but not occupying  a location in the 
core of wireless technology quickly vanished from the sector. 
Thus, based on this cursory discussion we predict: 
H2. The location of a firm in terms of closeness centrality in the technology space 
lowers its failure hazard rate. 
 
Deference in the Technology Space – From Whom 
Once a startup discloses its production of intellectual property,  other firms grant 
deference by acknowledging its R&D output as prior art. The act of deference is deemed 
beneficial and when revealed by prominent alters confers status (Podolny 2005). This 
argument assumes no costs to the actor receiving the deference. While this is generally 
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true in social settings where ambiguity abounds, given the nature of our context, 
disclosure is costly since its exposes the startups to imitation and other forms of 
appropraibility. This drawback of deference poses a challenge to the startup, especially 
when they originate from other firms rather than individuals. Continuing the example of 
ComSpace, its technology received the attention of industry giants such as Marconi, 
Ericsson, Sony and Nokia, which however did not have licensing agreements with 
ComSpace. An exception was a Hitachi business unit which did license. The higher the 
number of firms that acknowledges a firm’s IPR,  the more difficult is it for its owner  to  
monetize it into revenue producing licensing agreements. Given the additional threat of 
litigation from powerful players in a highly contested domain the threat of failure is 
exacerbated when high levels of deference make it difficult for a start up to manage its 
R&D portfolio. . 
We therefore posit: 
H3. Failure hazard rate is positively associated with the flow of deference a 
starup receives from peer firms. 
 
Deference in the Technology Space – Technology Concentration 
The generality of a firms’ technology is determined by the diversity of domains it 
receives deference from. A more general purpose technology will likely have more 
applications than a firm that restricts itself to a narrow range of technology. Some 
startups thrive by search for applications outside its sector even if proximate industry 
peers shun them. Whether a startup‘s technology platform is general or specific can be 
inferred from the breadth of technology citing its IPR as prior art.  Danger Inc., the 
creator of the Sidekick illustrates this case when they sold themselves to Microsoft where 
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their current objective is to build great, intuitive client software for mobile handsets 
connected to hosted back-end services rather than their initial focus creating specific 
wireless devices themselves. Therefore a firm’s chances of avoiding failure  grows  if its 
technology enjoys wider appeal, the acknowledgement of  its R&D output is dispersed 
over a wider audience of peers, while firms with a very specific technology, as inferred 
from the diffusion or dispersion  of its audiences technology domains, are prone to failure 
which leads to the next hypothesis: 
H4. The higher the concentration of deference flow that a firm receives, greater is 
the failure rate. 
 
Deference in the Technology Space – When Does it Hurt? 
Based on our arguments on the number of deference received, and the technology 
concentration imputed in the above paragraphs we can deduce that a focused startup is 
better capable to contain spillover and  in policing its IPR portfolio. Similarly, it will 
easier to handle a general purpose technology if fewer peer firms recognize its prior art. 
By contrast, a comparative large technological audience with a general purpose 
technology is very challenging for a startup to cope with. Thus we predict an interaction 
effect: 
H5. The interaction between the concentration of deference flow and the flow of 
the number of peers’ acknowledgements is negatively related to its failure hazard 
rate. 
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METHODS 
Research Setting 
We conducted this study in the wireless sector and focus on venture funded 
startups in the US. Wireless or mobile communication is chosen since the appropriability 
regime is relatively weak as required by our theory. Although the firms are located in the 
US, their scope is global. Wireless is a global industry with multinational firms such as 
Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm, Samsung, Motorola, T-Mobile and Vodafone dominating 
the competitive landscape. Although the sector has a very complex value network with a 
variety of corporation as illustrated in figure 1 (Camponovo & Pigneur, 2002), it is 
dominated by the network operators and the vendors of equipments and handsets. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The high growth potential and variety of opportunities across the value network 
due deregulation and technology changes have spurred a high level of startup activity. 
These activities have been global although dominated by US based firms as shown below. 
Next the history of the sector is briefly reviewed. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Brief History of Wireless 1990-2009 
Wireless has experienced tremendous growth since the early nineties with the 
introduction of digital technologies in cellular systems.  The introduction of GSM 
(Global System for Mobile communications) in Europe in 1991 was a fundamental driver 
made possible through a wave of technological, institutional and market innovations.  
Although there was inter-regional heterogeneity, these so called 2G (second generation 
technologies which were all digital) cellular technologies kick started the innovations that 
received a lot of attention and money from venture capitalists through the boom and bust 
of the Internet, peaking in 2006.  While cellular technologies anchor the wireless arena, 
the innovations in the sector are not just limited to them.  Wi-Fi, WiMax, Bluetooth, 
UWB, ZigBee, GPS and RFID represent some of the other technologies that were 
developed and financed by investors.  Figure 3 and 4 below illustrate the relationship 
between the various technologies classified according to two dimensions, the coverage 
area and bandwidth. These two dimensions are a function of the frequency spectrum used 
by the technology and limited by the physics of that space.  
Coverage area is determined by the distance the waves propagate and the ease 
with which they penetrate dense obstacles like walls and trees. The bandwidth determines 
the maximum information carrying capacity of the medium and is conditioned by the 
energy that a signal can carry which is limited by the spectrum space, technology and 
regulations.  A unifying force behind all these technologies is the trade-off between 
coverage and bandwidth that has led to the need for co-existence among these 
technologies as no single wireless technology can fulfill all the demands of wireless 
applications. This has become extremely important with the introduction of data services 
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on cellular systems with the transition to data focused 2.5G and 3G standards starting at 
the turn of this century.  Voice, the predominant application of cellular system, is poised 
to become one among many data applications with varying bandwidth needs. Another 
significant effect of this movement towards data is that technologies in software, 
applications and content for wireless have received a lot of attention.  Thus the traditional 
concentration on components, equipments, systems and management software has been 
complemented with spot on software, applications and content for mobile data services.   
Wireless Startup “Technology space” 
Several authors have tried to categorize the technology space and the European 
Patent Office even provides an IP “web-guide” by country, scientific field and other 
classes.  In this paper we construct the technology space by dint of a time invariant 
network of US startup firms founded between 1990 and 2009 whose accumulation of 
intellectual property becomes spatially tied to that of other firms through shared IPC 
technology classes. In other words, technology similarity is captured through shared 
technology classes and is used to capture the core-peripheral structure of this field.  We 
used Derwent, a database of patents maintained by Thomson to collect patents of all the 
startups in our sample and the assigned IPC codes. We use Derwent because it is a 
database of global patents. Since the ambit of activity of our startups is international in 
nature, using Derwent is more appropriate than using the USPTO database. Figure 1 
shows the startup technology space. We can clearly see the core-periphery structure as 
posited in the section on theory.  
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Data & Sample 
We test our theory using the population of all firms in the US wireless and mobile 
communication sector that were founded between the year 1990 to 2009 and received at 
least one round of early stage VC funding. There are 428 such firms as documented by 
VentureXpert, the leading source of information on Venture Capital from Thomson 
Research, commonly viewed as the most comprehensive and widely used database for 
research on venture funded companies. We classify startups as wireless firms  using the 
Venture Economics Industry Classification (VEIC) of Thomson with those residing 
within  the VEIC codes of 1300-1399 range. We supplement the VEIC code with a 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code from SDC Platinum, Hoovers and CorpTech. 
The data for this study came from a variety of sources. While the main information on 
our sample on  firms, including their  their financing and products came from 
VentureXpert IPR information was  obtained from Derwent, a database of global patents 
maintained by Thomson since 1969 and frequently used previously in strategic 
management research (e.g., Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Eggers, 2008).  The 
Thompson IPR  database provided much better coverage for our sample of firms  (more 
than 25% firms have patents when compared to the USPTO) because of its  global reach. 
Other data related to  alliances were collected  from three different archives, SDC 
Platinum, Factiva and the historical websites using the Wayback machine 
(http://web.archive.org). For Merger & Acquisition & IPO data we used SDC, Zephyr, 
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Factiva and Hoovers primarily. Finally COMPUSTAT was accessed for  segment data on 
wireless firms which are in the public domain.  
Dependent Variables 
Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables used in our analysis. Since we are 
using a competing risk model of either a successful or failed outcome, we identify these 
outcomes and create firm-year spells from founding to outcome or censoring at the end of 
2009. We identify firms that were liquidated as outright bankrupt or were acquired in a 
distressed sale  (dummy variable Failures) in the year of exit. Those that experience an 
IPO or were acquired are flagged as successful firms (dummy variable Successes) in the 
year of the event. We model the hazard rate using the time to either of these outcomes 
experienced by the firm from birth.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Independent Variables 
Patent Grant Flow is a variable that captures the number of patent granted to a 
firm in a given year and  signals to its audiences the creation  of property . We capture its 
location in the technology space by calculating the closeness centrality in a network 
constructed through shared IPC classes. The variable Closeness centrality in startup 
technology space captures its  peripheral to core position,  with increasing value from 0 to 
1. This metric is time invariant over the widow of study.  
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Deference is measured with an annual  count variable, Patent Cite Flow by Firms, 
which is the number of forward citations received by the firm from peer organizations in 
a given year.  
Finally, we quantified a firm’s  annual  audience diversity as the inverse of the 
heterogeneity in forward citations received.  That diversity is captured by the Hefindahl 
index of  IPC classes associated with patent classes of firms which cite the focal startup’s 
newly granted IPR. We surmise that the startup’s peers as competitive audience which 
mention the startup’s patents and which  belong to a relatively narrow band of 
technologies, its  IPR should be viewed as very focused and specialized.  The variable 
Concentration of Fw Cite Flow, by computing the sum of the square of the share of each 
of the IPC classes of the patents citing the firm.  
Control Variables 
Obviously we ought to hold many factors, associated with entrepreneurial firms, 
constant that others have identified as shaping the viability and eventual success or 
failure among new ventures. These controls can be categorized in five broad categories. 
First, related to IPR we include the stock of patents granted and forward cites received . 
We also control for the total flow of forward cites, signaling the aggregate value of a 
startup’s  IPR. The second category controls for exit market conditions that either 
constrain or embellish a startups outlook. . The intensity of  annual IPO activity in a 
startup”s four digit defined industry  as well as the annual  incidence of  acquisitive 
activity inn that industry  is computed. The third group of  control variables holds 
investor characteristic constant. These include the number of investors, whether the 
investors are corporate venture capitalists and the number of investors who invest in all 
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rounds of financing. These controls are often deemed important in moving a new venture 
beyond the adolescent stage.  Fourth, related to the financing received, we control for  the 
number of financing and  time to the first date of VC financing. Finally, the fifth category 
includes  so called corporate development actions, i.e., namely strategic alliances and 
acquisitions. We also included a control variable at sector level, growth using total sales 
per year of all business segments that publicly quoted wireless operators and vendors 
operate in and  entry year of the startup i.e., left censoring in the event history model. 
Method  
We use a competing risk Cox proportional hazard model (Lee & Wang, 2003) of 
the wireless startup outcome rate. The idea of the competing risks model is to let the 
hazard rate vary with the end state.  In the framework of a competing risks model, the 
duration corresponding to the state not realized is truncated. From a methodological point 
of view, this implies that the realized state will contribute to the likelihood function via 
its density function, while the truncated state contributes to the likelihood function via its 
survivor function. Competing risks models focus on both the type of exits and time to exit 
(duration). In contrast, a Logit model for example would only focus on the type of exit 
(binary choice) and the likelihood function of a Logit model would not take into account 
the time variable (compare JBF, 2005). The regressions were computed using the stcox 
procedure of STATA. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 present the correlations and descriptive statistics of the variables included 
in the analysis.  We ran diagnostics for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation 
Working Paper: Do not cite 
Factor (vif) procedure after running an OLS regression in STATA and found no 
significant issues in spite of the relatively high correlation among several variables. On 
average fa irm in our study obtains one patent per year, received approximately  four cites 
per year and exhibits  a technology concentration (Herfindahl)  of 12% among its forward 
citations. The average closeness centrality is 0.01 with a maximum of 0.02. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The five hypotheses were tested by fitting a competing risk Cox proportional 
hazard model to the data as elaborated above. Table 3a & 3b presents the results for the 
two competing risks, failure and success. Our main hypotheses apply to the  case of 
failure. We contrast these results with those involving to bolster the robustness of our 
inferences. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3a & 3b about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The two tables show seven models that we fitted. Model 7 is the full model that 
we will use for our analysis. Hypothesis 1 posited a U shaped relationship between the 
failure hazard rate and the flow of patents received. This is strongly supported in model 
both model 6 & 7 in Table 3a with a negative main effect and a positive effect for the 
quadratic term. Thus the value of patents as signal hypothesis is corroborated 
Interestingly the case of successful outcome also gives moderate support (5% 
significance) to this thesis (model 7 Table 3b). The success rate is inverse U shaped with 
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respect to patent grant.  Thus in our view the benefits of signaling by a startup are 
important and outweighs the costs of disclosure. 
H2 is also strongly supported in all the models in Table 3a, suggecting that 
startups fare better if they are central within the wireless sector, while those located in 
marginal locations face early exits . Paradoxically,  Table 3b shows that it is a “non 
factor” for success. H3 is strongly supported in model 7 but only mildly in model 6. 
While cites by firms are harmful, total cites are beneficial. Also this variable has no effect 
for the case of success, once again showing that the mechanisms driving failure and 
success are very different. H4 is strongly supported in model (7). Diversity is conducive 
to reduced risk but is not conducive to IPO or acquisition—our outcome of success.. 
Finally H5 provides intriguing yet compelling evidence regarding the outlook of fledging  
ventures. Note the interaction effect of receiving wide IPR acclaim a revealed by forward 
citations and concentration of its technological audience (Herfndahl of peers’ technology 
classes) The interaction effect on failure is negative and moderately significant while the 
same effect is weakly significant for the case of success,. The implication is that startups 
with  high citation counts form a dispersed and diverse audience  tend to survive without 
liquidity events, i.e. startups that some VC’s have called “living deads”. 
The results obtained must be seen in the light of the limitations of the method. We 
tested for the violation of proportionality assumption of the Cox model. The global test 
failed. However the failure was accounted by just one control variable. Dropping that 
variable does not change the results. We will also do more robustness checks and fit 
competing risk models using a Mixed-Gamma distribution model in the future.  We also 
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did likelihood ratio tests between the models with quadratic and interaction terms to 
check for spurious effects. Perhaps leave this para out? 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper has sought to break new grounds regarding the factors that account for 
the success and failures of new firms that entered a highly competitive, technologically 
intense, uncertain and fluid market dominated by two classes of titans, the handset 
producers and telecommunication carriers. While the setting is unique in many ways, the 
wireless sector shares certain characteristics with other industries, especially around the 
creation, accumulation and aprpropriability of intellectual property —for example 
semiconductors, computer software and imaging. In our setting we explored the entry of 
new ventures with new and future proprietary technology, whose R&D signals might 
contribute to the endorsement (Stuart et al, 1999) by venture capital firms, illustrating the 
two sides of the small fish in a big pond metaphor. Through future citations they receive 
feedback, if not status and further endorsement regarding their innovative performance. 
Yet they also expose themselves to the risk of knowledge theft, imitation, reverse 
engineering, litigation and even early exit. 
We have shown that such new ventures endure significant risks when they 
disseminate their new technological inventions through patent filing to an audience that 
often comprises larger and older competitors in the very same industry. When that signal 
is highly focused and received by firms in the very same technological cluster or niche 
(Podolny and Stuart, 1995), as operationalized by future citations from a relatively 
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homogenous set of peers, the startup often seals its own unpleasant fate, even if  future 
citations in general convey positive feedback, and produce value to the firm.  
Our study  highlights the importance of patents as signal. We find the benefits of 
their use both in the case of failure and success. Thus, our interpretation is that IPR as 
signal for  their underlying value in providing legitimacy outweighs endorsement of 
technology with concomitant risks of reverse engineering, especially in our setting where 
IP regime is not as strong as in Pharmaceuticals and Chemical. Since many high-tech 
industries share this characteristic, our results are  generalizable to other settings—most 
notably other high technology sectors such as semiconductors. . 
Perhaps the most compelling result of our study is the startup’s generality of its 
technology. If its signals convey a general technologies exit is avoided, yet such strategy 
is  not sufficient for success. The intriguing result comes from the interaction of the 
generality of the technology and the degree of deference received. In both successful and 
failed scenarios, firms  endowed with narrow technologies combined with high levels of 
forward citation per year face a lower probability of either succeeding or failing, a 
condition that VC’s often called living dead (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1987). This state 
of “morbidity” obtains under conditions of  small market growth or the appropriation of 
created value is difficult 
Being a single industry study our paper requires the usual disclaimers of  
generalizability. Yet,  the wireless industry  represents the norm in high-technology when 
dealing with of the strength of  appropriability regime, compared to other common 
entrepreneurial investigations such as pharmaceuticals or biotechnoly. Our methods can 
also be refined and made more robust., an issue we will address in the future.  
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While our study has produced some important advancements on entrepreneurship 
research, , many issues remain. . Clearly,  the analysis hints at a range of signals, beyond  
technological innovation that startups emit, for example alliances with peers, staffing of 
key positions, personal networking, press releases (e.g., Pontikes, 2010) and marketing 
actions, such as the launch of new products or services. Finally, we stress two unresolved 
concerns. First, while the bulk of entrepreneurial performance confines itself to success 
and failure, we believe that such a simply dichotomy is misplaced. Like any set of 
comparisons, we encounter variations in performance. We noted a category called “living 
dead” which falls in neither the success nor failure category.   Second, since the study by 
Stuart, Huang and Hybels (1999) is has become taken for granted that endorsement is a 
positive outcome for any fledging company and is framed as one of its most important 
intangible asset. Because our results call such a claim into question, we need to acquire a 
deeper understanding of deference as an implicit if not explicit endorsement behavior—
which has become so central in the current research on markets as status systems 
(Podolny, 2005) and is fraught with endogeneity issues.. 
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 Figure 1.  Wireless Actors Map 
 
Working Paper: Do not cite 
Figure 2.  Global Wireless VC backed Startup Activity 1990-2009 
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Figure 3.  WirelessTechnologies 
 
Figure 4.  Bandwidth versus Coverage Tradeoff 
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Figure 5.  Wireless Startup Technology Space 1990-2009 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
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Table 3a. Cox Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model - Failure 
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Table 3b. Cox Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model - Success 
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